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SANTA FE INDEPENDENT SCHOOL
DISTRICT v. DOE: ESTABLISHMENT
CLAUSE CHAOS ON THE HIGH SCHOOL
GRIDIRON
LAWRENCE J. CHANICE"
"The Court distorts existing precedent to conclude that the
school district's student-message program is invalid on its face
under the Establishment Clause. But even more disturbing than
its holding is the tone of the Court's opinion; it bristles with
hostility to all things religious in public life."
-Chief Justice William Rehnquistl
INTRODUCTION
A. Confusion in the Courts of Appeals
The first "right" bestowed upon the American people by the
First Amendment provides: "Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion .. ."2 Although this
phrase is plainly worded, it has beleaguered courts3 since coming
into the limelight in 1947 when the Supreme Court upheld a
t J.D. Candidate, June 2001, St. John's University School of Law; B.A., St.
John's University.
I Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 318 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J.,
dissenting).
2 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
3 See Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 392 (1983) (noting that while "it is easy
enough to quote the few words constituting that clause[,]" the phrase "presents
especially difficult questions of interpretation and application"). This sentiment
expressed by the courts has been echoed in the writings of legal commentators. See
Thomas F. LaMacchia, Reverse Accommodation of Religion, 81 GEO. L.J. 117 (1992)
(noting that after two centuries, there is still great difficulty in interpreting the
Establishment Clause); Kurt T. Lash, The Status of Constitutional Religious Liberty
at the End of the Millennium, 32 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1, 1 (1998) ('The disarmingly
brief phrase has been notoriously difficult to interpret.... "); Robert C. Stelle,
Comment, Religious Freedom in the Twenty-First Century: Life Without Lemon, 23
S. ILL. U. L.J. 657, 657 (1999) (stating that the "simple ten-word phrase" has
brought about as much consternation "as any other legal provision throughout our
history").
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Board of Education resolution that provided transportation to
both public and parochial school students. 4 It was not until a
decade and a half later that the Supreme Court handed down its
first decision striking down prayer in public school.5
Since then, the Court has used a variety of theories to
"cleanse" public schools of worship.6 In consequence, localities
have attempted to overcome Establishment Clause challenges by
crafting various types of schemes that would allow for prayer in
public school. 7 Upon judicial review in the federal courts,
4 See Everson v. Board of Educ. of Ewing Township, 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947)
(representing the first landmark case to interpret the meaning of the Establishment
Clause). In Everson, the Court enumerated several types of actions that are
prohibited by the Establishment Clause:
Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither
can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion
over another. Neither can force nor influence a person to go to or to remain
away from church against his will or force him to profess a belief or
disbelief in any religion. No person can be punished for entertaining or
professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church attendance or non-
attendance. No tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support
any religious activities or institutions, whatever they may be called, or
whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice religion. Neither a state
nor the Federal Government can, openly or secretly, participate in the
affairs of any religious organizations or groups and vice versa.
Id. at 15-16.
5 See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 436 (1962) (ruling that New York's program
of daily classroom prayer violated the Establishment Clause).
6 Cf Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 857 n.2
(1995) (discussing Madison's Remonstrance which calls for a cleansing of religious
overtones in speech). See infra Part II.A. (synthesizing Supreme Court decisions
relating to prayer in public schools).
7 See Adler v. Duval County Sch. Bd., 206 F.3d 1070, 1071-72 (11th Cir. 2000)
(en banc) (relating to a policy that required a student vote to decide upon the
occurrence of an unrestricted student speech at graduation), vacated, 121 S. Ct. 31
(2000); see also Chandler v. James, 180 F.3d 1254, 1256 (11th Cir. 1999) (concerning
a policy that permitted "non-sectarian, non-proselytizing student-initiated
voluntary prayer, invocations and/or benedictions during compulsory or non-
compulsory school related student assemblies, sporting events, school-related
graduation or commencement ceremonies and other school-related student events"),
vacated sub nom. Chandler v. Siegelman, 120 S. Ct. 2714 (2000); Doe v. Madison
Sch. Dist. No 321, 147 F.3d 832, 834 (9th Cir. 1998) (ruling on a policy that
permitted the administration to choose students to deliver an address, poem,
reading, song, musical presentation, prayer or any other pronouncement of their
choosing at commencement exercises), vacated for procedural reasons, 177 F.3d 789
(9th Cir. 1999); ACLU v. Black Horse Pike Reg'l Bd. of Educ., 84 F.3d 1471, 1474-75
(3d Cir. 1996) (pertaining to a policy that provided for a student vote to determine
whether or not to have prayer at graduation); Harris v. Joint Sch. Dist. No. 241, 41
F.3d 447, 453 (9th Cir. 1994) (relating to a scheme whereby students voted to choose
religious prayer at their graduation), vacated as moot, 515 U.S. 1154 (1995); Jones
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differing policies caused a split in opinion in the circuit courts,
thereby creating the need for a definitive answer from the
Supreme Court.8 Recently, in Santa Fe Independent School
District v. Doe,9 the Supreme Court attempted to provide an
answer when it invalidated a school district's policy for pre-
football game ceremonies. 10
B. The Decision in Santa Fe Independent School District
The parties in Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. endured a lengthy,
turbulent relationship"3 that came to a head in 1994 when the
Santa Fe Independent School District (School District) began
enacting a series of policies that permitted the recitation of
invocations and benedictions at school events. 12 Not more than a
year later, the plaintiffs, a group of current and former school
v. Clear Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 977 F.2d 963, 964 n.1 (5th Cir. 1992) (involving a
policy that permitted students to deliver a non-sectarian and non-proselytizing
invocation or benediction at graduation).
8 Compare Jones, 977 F.3d at 967-68 (5th Cir. 1992) (upholding a challenge to
a school prayer policy because the primary effect was secular, was not an excessive
entanglement between government and religion, and did not endorse a religion or
coerce participation) and Doe v. Madison Sch. Dist. No. 321, 147 F.3d 832 (9th Cir.
1998) (upholding school prayer policy using the Lemon test) and Adler v. Duval Cty.
School Bd., 206 F.3d 1070 (11th Cir. 2000) (upholding school prayer policy) with
ACLU v. Black Horse Pike Reg'l Bd. of Educ., 84 F.3d 1471, 1482 (1996) (holding
that school prayer policy violated the Establishment Clause) and Freiler v.
Tangipahoa Parish Bd. of Educ., 185 F.3d 337 (5th Cir. 1999) (striking down a
school prayer policy as an endorsement of religion).
9 530 U.S. 290 (2000).
10 See id. at 316-17.
11 See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 168 F.3d 806, 809-11 (5th Cir. 1999),
affd, 530 U.S. 290 (2000). Conflict between the Santa Fe Independent School
District (School District) and its critics commenced in April of 1993 when a seventh
grade history teacher admonished one of his students for adhering to the Mormon
faith. See id. at 809. Shortly thereafter at the commencement exercises of 1993, the
School District permitted its graduates to deliver prayers. See id. at 810-811. This
practice was extended to its high school football games and continued into the 1993-
94 academic year. See id.
12 See id. at 811. On the heels of Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992), the
School District enacted its first written policy in 1994 which prohibited clergymen
and school officials from presenting "invocations or benedictions at promotional and
graduation ceremonies for secondary schools." Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 168 F.3d.
at 811. Then, in response to the fifth circuit's decision in Jones v. Clear Creek Ind.
Sch. Dist., 977 F.2d 963 (5th Cir. 1992), the School district amended the policy to
allow graduating seniors "to elect to choose student volunteers to deliver
nonsectarian, nonproselytizing invocations and benedictions for the purpose of
solemnizing their graduation ceremonies." Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 168 F.3d at
811.
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attendees and their parents, initiated an action in the Federal
District Court for the Southern District of Texas alleging that a
variety of practices performed by the School District violated the
Establishment Clause. 13 The focus of their attack, however, was
the School District's practice of allowing its students to recite
religious messages at graduation ceremonies and high school
football games. 14 To ease the tension that surrounded the
upcoming commencement exercises, the district court entered an
interim order which provided that a " 'non-denominational
prayer' consisting of 'an invocation and/or benediction' could be
presented by a senior student or students selected by members of
the graduating class." 15
To comply with that order, the School District modified its
existing policy for graduation exercises in May and July of
1995.16 In August, the School District created a policy entitled
"Prayer at Football Games."17 This policy provided that the
students would hold two elections.' 8 The first election would
permit the students to decide whether an "invocation" would be
delivered, while the second election would enable them to choose
their "spokesperson" who would decide upon the message to be
delivered.19 The policy did not limit the students to invocations
of a non-sectarian and non-proselytizing nature.20  It did,
however, contain a fallback provision that provided for such
constraints if the policy were to be enjoined.2' Shortly after the
School District implemented the policy, the high school
13 See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 530 U.S. at 294-95. The Does claimed that
the School District was responsible for "promoting attendance at a Baptist revival
meeting, encouraging membership in religious clubs, chastising children who held
minority religious beliefs, and distributing Gideon Bibles on school premises." Id. at
295. They sought to enjoin the School district as well as obtain monetary relief
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 168 F.3d at 811.
14 See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 530 U.S. at 295.
15 Id. at 295-96. The district court further provided that the prayer could refer
to prominent religious individuals such as Jesus or Buddha "as long as the general
thrust of the prayer [was] non-proselytizing." Id. at 296. In relation to the other
claims of the plaintiffs, the district court implored the School District to devise new
policies and amend existing ones. Id. at 295 n.3.
16 See id. at 296-97. For a complete reproduction of the May and July policies,
see Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 168 F.3d at 811-12.
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students voted or a pre-game prayer and elected a student
speaker for the presentation.22
In October of that year, the School District amended the
August policy.23 More specifically, it changed the title of the
policy to "Pre Game Ceremonies at Football Games."24
Additionally, it utilized neutral terms such as "messages,"
"statements," and "invocations" as opposed to religious terms
like "prayer."25 Unlike the August policy, the students never
held any elections under this policy.26 An order of the district
court struck down the part of the policy that did not limit the
students to the recitation of messages that were non-sectarian
and non-proselytizing, but upheld the fallback provision that
added such limitation upon the imposition of an injunction.27
Upon review of the district court decision, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit found that the entire policy
violated the Establishment Clause.28  The School District
appealed,29  and the United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari.30 For the reasons set forth below, the Court
22 See id; see also Nancy E. Drane, Comment, The Supreme Court's Missed
Opportunity: The Constitutionality of Student-Led Graduation Prayer in Light of the
Crumbling Wall Between Church and State, 31 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 497, 497 (2000)
(illustrating the harrowing experience of Marian Ward, the speaker selected by the
student body for the pre-game invocation); Christopher J. Heinze, Illegal Procedure:
Student Delivered Prayer at Public High School Football Games-An Examination
of the Encroachment on Religious Freedom in Doe v. Santa Fe Independent School
District, 23 HAMLINE L. REV. 427, 428 (likening Ward to a "rock star"); David G.
Savage, The Praying Fields of Texas, A.B.A. J., March 2000, at 34 ("' was glad to
have the opportunity to stand up and protect the rights of Christian students ....
As far as I am concerned, religious speech shouldn't have to take second place to
secular speech.'") (statement of Marian Ward).
23 See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 530 U.S. at 298.
24 Id. at 298 n.6.
2 Id.
26 See id. at 298 n.5.
27 See id. at 299. The district court found that the section of the policy that did
not restrict the students to non-sectarian prayer failed because it violated the
constitutional principle that a "school's 'action must not coerce anyone to support or
participate in a religious exercise.' "Id. (quoting Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 587
(1992)).
28 See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., at 299-300. Strictly construing Fifth Circuit
precedent that permitted prayer at graduations, the court found that the
atmosphere associated with a football game was not analogous to the
commencement exercise setting. See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 168 F.3d at 823
("The prayers are to be delivered at football games-hardly the sober type of annual
event that can be appropriately solemnized with prayer.").
29 See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 530 U.S. at 301.
30 See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 528 U.S. 1002, 1002 (1999) (limiting
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [Vol.75:137
held that the policy violated the Establishment Clause.31
First, the Court considered whether the student messages
were private or public speech.3 2 According to the School District,
if the students' messages were deemed private speech, then the
Establishment Clause would not apply.33 While agreeing that
the Establishment Clause did not apply to private speech, the
Court rejected the idea that the speech in this case was private.34
Instead, it found that "these invocations [were] authorized by
government policy and [took] place on government property at
government-sponsored school-related events."35 Although not all
such speech can be attributed to the government, the Court
found that the speech in this case was governmental in nature
since "the District [had] failed to divorce itself from the religious
content in the invocations."3 6 Finally, the Court held that
although the policy claimed to have a secular purpose,37 the
school's history with prayer policies and practices indicates its
intention of furthering state-sponsored religion. 38
Second, the Court examined the School District's argument
that its policy did not coerce students into participating in a
review to the issue of "[wihether [the District's] policy permitting student-led,
student-initiated prayer at football games violates the Establishment Clause").
31 See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 530 U.S. at 317 ('The policy is invalid on its
face because it establishes an improper majoritarian election on religion, and
unquestionably has the purpose and creates the perception of encouraging the
delivery of prayer at a series of important school events.").
32 See id. at 301-10.
33 See id. at 302.
34 See id.
35 Id.
36 Id. at 305 ("In this case, as we found in Lee, the 'degree of school involvement'
makes it clear that the pregame prayers bear 'the imprint of the State and thus put
school-age children who objected in an untenable position.' " (quoting Lee v.
Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 590 (1992)). More specifically, the Court believed that the
School District was overly involved because it chose to have the elections, advised
the students, and required that the message set forth by the student be consistent
with the School District's policy. See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 530 U.S. 305-06.
Furthermore, the presentation of the policy before a student audience over the
School District's public address system indicated such involvement. See id. at 307.
As a result, the Court held that " 'an objective observer... would perceive it as a
state endorsement of prayer in public schools.' " Id. at 308 (quoting Wallace v.
Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 73 (1985) (O'Connor, J. concurring)).
37 See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 530 U.S. at 309. The policy stated that its
purpose was "to solemnize the event, to promote good sportsmanship and student
safety, and to establish the appropriate environment for the competition." Id- at 298
n.6.
38 See id. at 309.
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religious ceremony.3 9 In striking down this argument, the Court
believed that although the election process may be perceived as
providing students with a choice in the matter, it ultimately
"[would encourage] divisiveness" among religious beliefs which,
in turn, could not be tolerated in a public school setting.40 Also,
the Court concluded that even though attendance at the football
game would be voluntary for some, there were others, such as
the players themselves and cheerleaders, who were required to
attend the games.41 Moreover, students not required to attend
the games were forced unfairly to weigh their religious beliefs
against the genuine social pressure of attending a traditional
gathering of the school community.42
The final issue considered by the Court was whether the
challenge by the plaintiffs was premature. 43 To address this
matter, the Court applied the test created in Lemon v.
Kurtzman." Under that test, the Lemon Court found that the
policy operated for an "unconstitutional purpose. 45  More
specifically, it ruled that such a conclusion could be found in the
plain text of the policy because the language employed was not
39 See id. at 310. There were two arguments advanced by the School District.
See id. First, it claimed that the students chose whether or not to have such a
pregame ceremony. See id. Secondly, it argued that the football game was
extracurricular unlike the graduation ceremony in Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577
(1992). See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 530 U.S. at 310.
40 Id. at 311.
41 See id.
42 See id. at 312 ("For many others, however, the choice between whether to
attend these games or to risk a personally offensive religious ritual is in no practical
sense an easy one."). The Court reasoned that the "constitutional command will not
permit the District 'to exact' religious conformity from a student as 'a price' of
joining her classmates at a varsity football game." Id. (quoting Lee, 505 U.S. at 595-
96). As illustrated by his words in this case and other cases, it is evident that
Justice Stevens champions the view that there must be "adequate consideration for
the religious beliefs of minorities in society." Lisa Langendorfer, Comment,
Establishing a Pattern: An Analysis of the Supreme Court's Establishment Clause
Jurisprudence, 33 U. RICH. L. REV. 705, 715 (1999) (discussing Justice Stevens'
method for resolving Establishment Clause controversies).
43 See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 530 U.S. at 313-16. The School District
argued that it is speculative that a student would deliver a religious prayer since no
invocations were ever presented under the new October policy. See id. at 313.
44 403 U.S. 602 (1971). There are three factors in this test. See id. at 612. "First,
the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary
effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion... ; finally, the
statute must not foster 'an excessive entanglement with religion.' " Id. at 612-13
(citations omitted).
45 Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 530 U.S. at 314.
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"content neutral."46 Additionally, upon consideration of the
context in which this case arose, the Court determined that there
was no "doubt that this policy was implemented with the
purpose of endorsing school prayer."47 It concluded its response
to the School District's argument that it "need not wait for the
inevitable to confirm and magnify the constitutional injury."48
The dissent criticized the Court's analysis of the last issue.49
First, it questioned the majority's use of the Lemon test.50 Then,
the dissent argued that the Court reached the wrong result upon
application of the test 51 and emphasized that there had never
been an election under the policy.52 Furthermore, according to
the dissent, the Court did not consider the possibility that the
students could vote not to have an election, or that if an election
occurred, it would focus on popularity instead of religion.53
Additionally, the dissent believed that the policy had a viable
secular purpose for its foundation.54 Finally, it concluded its
attack on the majority with the argument that "our
Establishment Clause jurisprudence simply does not mandate
'content neutrality.' 
-55
46 Id. at 315. Here, the Court was concerned with the extent of school
involvement, the use of the word "invocation," and "the extremely selective access of
the policy." Id.
47 Id. Not even the implementation of an elective process could sway the court
to believe otherwise. See id. at 316-17 ("[The election] further empowers the student
body majority with the authority to subject students of minority views to
constitutionally improper messages.").
48 Id. at 417 ('The policy is invalid on its face because it establishes an
improper majoritarian election on religion, and unquestionably has the purpose and
creates the perception of encouraging the delivery of prayer at a series of important
school events.").
49 See id. at 318-20 (Rehnquist C.J., dissenting).
50 See id. at 319 (describing it as "the oft criticized test").
51 See id. at 320 ("Even if it were appropriate to apply the Lemon test here, the
district's student message policy should not be invalidated on its face.").
52 See id. at 320 n.2 (contending that the October policy would allow a student
to present "a message as opposed to an invocation").
53 See id. at 320-21 ("It is conceivable that the election could become one in
which student candidates campaign on platforms that focus on whether or not they
will pray if elected."). The new policy would allow for such possibilities. See id.
Furthermore, it is "[t]he elected student, not the government, [who] would choose
what to say." Id. at 321.
54 See id. at 322 (stating that the policy had "plausible secular purposes" in
aiming to solemnize a sporting event). Moreover, the court found that in amending
its policy, "the school district was acting diligently to come within the governing
constitutional law." Id. at 323.
55 Id..at 325 (declaring, "This is undoubtedly a new requirement.").
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C. Ambitions of this Comment
This Comment will argue that the Court's decision in this
case neither conformed to the historical framework set up by the
framers of the Constitution nor to past school prayer case
precedent. Rather, it appears the Court will never allow the
states to consider for themselves whether or not there should be
prayer in public schools. As a result, it appears that the Court is
on the road to closing up all Establishment Clause loopholes that
might permit public school prayer, albeit in a limited fashion.
Part I of this Comment will delve into the history
surrounding the Establishment Clause. This Part will examine
the context in which the clause came to fruition and argue that
states were to be given unlimited discretion in defining church-
state relations within their boundaries. Part II will analyze
prior Supreme Court cases relating to prayer in public settings
and will utilize those cases to show that the Court prematurely
concluded that the policy was unconstitutional.
I. THE HISTORY OF THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
A. The Framers' Intent as to the Application of the
Establishment Clause to the States
Originalism is one of the competing theories that prescribe a
method for judicial interpretation of the U.S. Constitution.56
According to a prominent proponent of this doctrine, "a judge is
to apply the Constitution according to the principles intended by
those who ratified the document."57 Therefore, it is a theory that
can provide judges with a greater understanding of the meaning
56 See WILLIAM GANGI, SAVING THE CONSTITUTION FROM THE COURTS 126
(1995) (dividing the differing approaches into two schools: "interpretivists" and
"noninterpretivists"). Interpretivists believe that judges should have a "limited role"
when reading the Constitution, e.g., that they should adhere to the meanings
attached to its words by the framers. Id. Noninterpretivists, on the other hand, take
the position that "judges should not be confined by what the ratifiers of the
Constitution or any of its subsequent amendments understood their provisions to
mean." Id.
57 ROBERT BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF
THE LAW 143 (1990); see also JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND
IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION xiii (1996) ("The advocates of
originalism argue that the meaning of the Constitution, or of its individual clauses,
was fixed at the moment of its adoption, and that the task of interpretation is
accordingly to ascertain that meaning and apply it to the issue at hand.").
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of the troublesome words embodied within the Establishment
Clause.58 Relating originalism to the Establishment Clause in
the school prayer situation is difficult since the new country
lacked a nationwide public school system.5 9 Upon evaluating the
Framers' general impressions of the Bill of Rights and religion,
however, it certainly seems as if the Framers would have let the
states and localities govern church-state relations with respect to
school prayer.
B. The Framers'Reluctance to Adopt the Bill of Rights
The Federalist is a major source for discerning Framer
intent with regard to the words of the Constitution.60 In one of
these papers, the author argued that a bill of rights to the
Constitution was highly unnecessary for four reasons:61 (1) many
state constitutions at the time did not even set forth a bill of
rights;62 (2) the Constitution contained a number of implicit
rights;63 (3) the Constitution would not create a monarchy where
58 See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 113 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
("The true meaning of the Establishment Clause can only be seen in its history. As
drafters of our Bill of Rights, the Framers inscribed the principles that control
today. Any deviation from their intentions frustrates the permanence of that
Charter....") (citations omitted); LEONARD W. LEVY, THE ESTABLISHMENT
CLAUSE: RELIGION AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT xxii (2d ed., rev. 1994) ('With little
guidance from the constitutional text, we may better understand the American
experience with establishments of religion at the time of the ratification of the Bill
of Rights in 1791.").
59 See School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 238 n.7
(1963) (Brennan, J., concurring) (providing a history of the movement for public
education in the United States which did not produce positive results until the
1820's); Martha McCarthy, Religion and Education: Whither the Establishment
Clause?, 75 IND. L.J. 123, 123 (2000) (calling the application of the Establishment
Clause to school prayer cases a "mystery, because universal public education was
not yet prevalent when the Bill of Rights was adopted").
60 See WILLMOORE KENDALL & GEORGE W. CAREY, THE BASIC SYMBOLS OF THE
AMERICAN POLITICAL TRADITION 97-98 (1995) (contending that "The Federalist...
provides us with answers to some of our more perplexing questions"). The authors of
this work argue that this set of papers should be accorded significant weight for
three reasons: (1) the creation of The Federalist and the Constitution were close in
time to one another; (2) the papers were "an attempt to justify the Constitution in
the strongest possible terms in order to meet the objections of its critics and obtain
the support necessary for ratification in New York State;" and (3) The Federalist
provides clues as to how the Constitution should operate. See id. at 96.
61 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 84, at 510-15 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton
Rossiter ed., 1961).
62 See id. at 510 (expressing that New York, where most of the objection to a
lack of a bill of rights arose, was a state without such a bill).
63 See id. at 510-12 (naming the rights that the Constitution granted to its
[Vol.75:137
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such a bill would be essential;64 and (4) a bill of rights was
believed to be "dangerous" since it "would afford a colorable
pretext to claim more than w[as] granted."65 This sentiment was
further reflected at the Philadelphia convention of 1787 when
the states unanimously rejected the inclusion of a Bill of
Rights.66
As part of the First Amendment, the addition of the
Establishment Clause to the Constitution made it clear that the
rights applied to individuals in conflict with the federal
government, not the states.67 Therefore, it seems as if the
citizens). For example, the author found that the Constitution prohibited
impeachment with a penalty, suspension of habeas corpus unless a national
emergency existed, ex post facto laws, titles of nobility, and criminal cases without a
trial by jury. See id. Later on in the paper, the author exclaims, "IT]he Constitution
is itself, in every rational sense, and to every useful purpose, A BILL OF RIGHTS." Id.
at 515 (emphasis in original).
6 See id. at 512-513 (contending that a bill of rights is pivotal where there is a
relationship between a monarch and his or her subjects).
65 Id. at 513. "Why, for instance, should it be said that the liberty of press shall
not be restrained, when no power is given by which restrictions may be imposed?"
Id. at 513-14.
66 See CHRISTOPHER COLLIER & JAMES L. COLLIER, DECISION IN PHILADELPHIA:
THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1787 249-50 (1986) (discussing the defeat of
a bill of rights proposal at the Philadelphia convention); KENDALL & CAREY, supra
note 60, at 120 (asserting that the omission of the Bill of Rights from the
Constitution was not an "oversight").
67 See U.S. CONST. amend. I (providing that "Congress shall make no law");
AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 33
(1998) ("[A]s with the rest of the First Amendment, the establishment clause limited
only Congress and not the states; that point is obvious on the face of the amendment
and is confirmed by its legislative history.").
In 1833, the Supreme Court reiterated this understanding when it held that the
Bill of Rights did not apply to the states. See Barron v. Mayor & City Council of
Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7. Pet.) 243, 250-51 (1833) (holding that "the provision in the
fifth amendment to the constitution.., is intended solely as a limitation on the
exercise of power by the government of the United States, and is not applicable to
the legislation of the states"). To reach this result, the Supreme Court reasoned that
"[hlad congress engaged in the extraordinary occupation of improving the
constitutions of the several states by affording the people additional protection from
the exercise of power by their own governments in matters which concerned
themselves alone, they would have declared this purpose in plain and intelligible
language." Id. at 250. This understanding, of course, was overturned almost one
hundred years later by the Supreme Court when the incorporation doctrine was
utilized to make the religion clauses of the First Amendment applicable to the
states. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940) ("The Fourteenth
Amendment has rendered the legislatures of the states as incompetent as Congress
to enact such laws."). The application of the Establishment Clause to the states has
been criticized by both justices and commentators. See, e.g., School Dist of Abington
Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 310 (1963) (Stewart, J., dissenting) ("[1It is not
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [Vol.75:137
Framers crafted the First Amendment in such a way as "to allow
the States, unimpeded, to deal with religious establishments and
aid to religious institutions as they saw fit."68 With this in mind,
the fact that the Framers did not intend to apply the
Establishment Clause to the states indicated that they
supported the existing relationships between churches and the
states.69 Moreover, it might even have been intended to serve as
"an assurance to those nervous about the federal government
that it was not going to reverse any of the guarantees for
religious liberty won by the revolutionary states."70
without irony that a constitutional provision evidently designed to leave the States
free to go their own way should now have become a restriction upon their
autonomy."); AMAR, supra, at 33-34 (arguing that "the nature of the states'
establishment-clause right against federal disestablishment makes it quite
awkward to mechanically 'incorporate' the clause against the states" since it would
"eliminate [a state's] right to choose whether to establish a religion-a right clearly
confirmed by the establishment clause itself'); Robert P. George, Protecting
Religious Liberty in the Next Millennium: Should We Amend the Religion Clauses of
the Constitution?, 32 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 27, 44 (1998) ("It is logically impossible to
incorporate and apply against a state a provision whose purpose is to preserve the
state's prerogative.").
68 ROBERT L. CORD, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE: HISTORICAL FACT AND
CURRENT FICTION 15 (1982); see also AMAR, supra note 67, at 32 ("[The
Establishment Clause's] mandate that Congress shall make no law 'respecting an
establishment of religion'.., prohibited the national legislature from interfering
with, or trying to dis-establish, churches established by state and local
governments."); MICHAEL J. MALBIN, RELIGION AND POLITICS: THE INTENTIONS OF
THE AUTHORS OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 16 (1978) (contending that the
Establishment Clause "prohibited Congress from tampering with the state religious
establishments").
69 See MICHAEL CORBETT & JULIA MITCHELL CORBETT, POLITICS AND RELIGION
IN THE UNITED STATES 81 (1999) (providing that "it was still possible for a state to
establish a church; further, several states still had religious tests for public office
and did not give full citizenship rights to people who were not Protestants").
70 THOMAS J. CURRY, THE FIRST FREEDOMS: CHURCH AND STATE IN AMERICA
TO THE PASSAGE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 216 (1986); see also AMAR, supra note
67, at 33 ("[Wjhen all the dust had settled, the final version of the clause returned to
its states'-rights roots. In the words of Joseph Story's celebrated Commentaries on
the Constitution, 'the whole power over the subject of religion is left exclusively to
the state governments.' "); CORBETT & CORBETT, supra note 69, at 82 (asserting that
Congress desired to secure the necessary amount of state votes for ratification of the
amendment).
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C. Religious Establishment in the New Nation7'
Establishment of churches in the states was commonplace in
the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. In the era
leading up to the birth of the new nation, there were
establishments of religion in most of the colonies.72 Following
the Revolutionary War, some of the establishments existing
before the war were implanted within the new state
constitutions.7 3 When the Constitutional Convention convened
in 1787, five states still had established churches. 74 At the time
of the framing of the Bill of Rights, half of the states instituted
religious establishments. 5 Finally, over forty years after the
ratification of the Establishment Clause, the last church was
disestablished in Massachusetts. 76
71 Since there is a substantial amount of history to report upon the religious
practices of the states under the new Constitution, this Comment will not provide
an extensive, detailed analysis. Instead, this Comment will attempt to gather from
that history specific acts and practices tending to establish that the states were free
to define their own church-state relationships.
72 See CORBETT & CORBETT, supra note 69, at 29 ("[Rleligion and politics were
very much intertwined in colonial times, but there were substantial variations from
one colony to another. The southern colonies of Virginia, Maryland, North Carolina,
South Carolina, and Georgia established the Church of England as their official
church, while the New England colonies enacted laws that favored the
Congregationalist religion. See LEVY, supra note 58, at 1, 5. Only the colonies of
Rhode Island, Pennsylvania, Delaware and New Jersey, did not have an
establishment of religion. See id. at 11. New York was unique in that it "developed
an establishment of religion-or at least of Protestantism in general-without
preference to one church over others." Id.
73 See CORBETT & CORBETT, supra note 69, at 70-73 ("Some of [the state]
constitutions carried over the basic church-state arrangements that had existed
before independence, but changes occurred-sooner for some and later for others-
in almost all the arrangements.").
74 See CORD, supra note 68, at 4 (stating that Connecticut, Georgia,
Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and South Carolina still had such arrangements).
75 See LEVY, supra note 58, at xxii (stating that although "seven of the fourteen
states that comprised the Union in 1791 authorized establishments of religion by
law[, n]ot one state maintained a single or preferential establishment of religion");
Charles J. Russo, Prayer at Public School Graduation Ceremonies: An Exercise in
Futility or a Teachable Moment?, 1999 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 1, 2 ("[C]lose ties between
religion and government continued in several states even after the adoption of the
Bill of Rights."). Even the nonestablished states implemented religious
requirements for public office candidates. See AMAR, supra note 67, at 33
(expressing that "eleven of the thirteen states had religious qualifications for
officeholding").
76 See CORD, supra note 68, at 4 ("The elimination of the established churches
in the several states continued after the ratification of the Federal Constitution in
1788 and culminated in the disestablishment of the Congregational Church in
Connecticut in 1818, in New Hampshire in 1819, and in Massachusetts in 1833.").
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As stated above, discerning the Framers' intent with regard
to school prayer is an arduous task because the nation did not
have an extensive public education system at the creation of the
Establishment Clause.77 In addition to the facts that the Bill of
Rights was not intended to apply to the states, and that the
states had established religions well after the ratification of the
Constitution, other bits of history indicate that the Framers
would have approved of such a practice.78 First, some state
constitutions intertwined education with religion.79 Second, the
language of the Northwest Ordinance of 1787 spoke of religion
and education in the same context.80 The ordinance also set aside
federal land in those territories to be used for church-sponsored
schools. 8' Finally, the states may not have ratified the First
Amendment had they known that there would be national
control over their schools.82
Earlier Supreme Court cases declared that the Framers
intended the Establishment Clause to construct a "wall of
77 See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
78 Cf Russo, supra note 75, at 4 ("The notion of public education divorced from
denominational control was foreign to the colonial mind.").
79 The Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776 had consecutive provisions dealing
with public schooling and religious societies, which were considered to be "entities
designed for the 'encouragement of virtue' and Tor the advancement of religion or
learning.' " AMAR, supra note 67, at 44 (quoting PA. CONST. OF 1776 §§ 44-45)
(emphasis added). Similarly, in the sections of the Massachusetts Constitution of
1780 concerning church establishment, there was mentioning of "'public
instructions'" and" 'public teachers'" as well as a declaration that" 'the happiness
of a people, and the good order' of society 'depend upon piety, religion, and morality.'
" Id. (quoting MASS CONST. of 1780 pt. I, art. III). Additionally, there was a
statement evidencing the "religious roots" of Harvard College. Id. (quoting MASS
CONST. of 1780 pt. II, ch. V, § I, art. I.).
80 An Act to Provide for the Government of the Territory Northwest of the River
Ohio, 1 Stat. 50, 52 (1789) (stating that "[rieligion, morality, knowledge, being
necessary to good government and the happiness of mankind, schools and the
means of learning shall forever be encouraged").
81 See id.; see also John S. Baker, Jr., The Establishment Clause as Intended.
No Preference Among Sects and Pluralism in a Large Commercial Republic, in THE
BILL OF RIGHTS: ORIGINAL MEANING AND CURRENT UNDERSTANDING 41, 49
(Eugene W. Hickok Jr. ed., 1991) ("It would seem difficult to argue that the First
Congress, which proposed the religion clauses of the First Amendment and which by
reenacting the Northwest Ordinance extended religious freedom to the territories,
acted unconstitutionally by promoting religion, morality, and knowledge in public
education and setting aside land 'for the purposes of religion.' ").
82 See AMAR, supra note 67, at 45 ("The possibility of national control over a
powerful intermediate association self-consciously trying to influence citizens'
worldviews, shape their behavior, and cultivate their habits obviously struck fear in
the hearts of Anti-Federalists.").
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separation between church and state." 3 This often quoted
phrase can be attributed to the words of Thomas Jefferson in a
letter commenting upon the Establishment Clause.8 4 When
Jefferson spoke of this wall, it appears that he was referring to a
wall between the church and the federal government, not
between the church and the states, as evidenced by his second
inaugural address.85 Furthermore, this letter cannot be afforded
too much weight since it was written a significant amount of
time after the ratification of the First Amendment. 6 In the
words of Chief Justice Rehnquist, "unfortunately the
Establishment Clause has been expressly freighted with
Jefferson's misleading metaphor .... 87
D. Santa Fe Independent School District's Disregard of
Establishment Clause History
Unfortunately, Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. did not address
the events leading to the creation of the Establishment Clause,
which exhibited an understanding that the Establishment
83 Everson v. Bd. of Educ. of Ewing Township, 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947) ("In the
words of Jefferson, the clause against establishment of religion by law was intended
to erect 'a wall of separation between Church and State.' " (quoting Reynolds v.
United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878)).
84 See THOMAS JEFFERSON, Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Messrs. Nehemiah
Dodge, Ephraim Robbins & Stephen S. Nelson, Committee of the Danbury Baptist
Ass'n in the State of Connecticut (Jan 1, 1802), in THE COMPLETE JEFFERSON 518-
19 (Saul Y. Padover ed., 1943) [hereinafter Letter from Thomas Jefferson] ("I
contemplate with sovereign reverence that act of the whole American people which
declared that their legislature should 'make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof,' thus building a wall of separation
between church and State.").
85 See Thomas Jefferson, Second Inaugural Address, in INAUGURAL ADDRESSES
OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES, 15-16 (1964).
In matters of religion I have considered that its free exercise is placed by
the Constitution independent of the powers of the General Government. I
have therefore undertaken on no occasion to prescribe the religious
exercises suited to it, but have left them, as the Constitution found them,
under the direction and discipline of the church or state authorities
acknowledged by the several religious societies.
Id.
86 See Letter from Thomas Jefferson, supra note 84, at 518 (indicating that the
letter was written in 1802). The doctrine of originalism implores that the wording in
question be given the meaning it had up until the time of ratification. See RAKOVE,
supra note 57, at xiii (stating that the "meaning" of the phrases within the
Constitution were "fixed at the moment of [their] adoption").
87 Wallace v. JafEee, 472 U.S. 90, 92 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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Clause applied only to the actions of Congress.88 The majority,
perhaps, was just adhering to the precedent set by prior courts
including the incorporation doctrine, which applied the First
Amendment to conflicts between individuals and the states.8 9
How did the Court stray away from this historical framework?
The next part of this Comment endeavors to shed some light
on this matter and show that the Court's decision in Santa Fe
Indep. Sch. Dist. moves the Establishment Clause analysis
further away from both the historical understanding of the
Establishment Clause and existing precedent.
II. THE INCONGRUENCE BETWEEN PUBLIC SETTING PRAYER
PRECEDENT AND SANTA FE INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT
A. Past Controversies Involving Prayer in Public Settings
The Supreme Court has failed to articulate one clear test for
general Establishment Clause analysis, 90 let alone a viable mode
of analysis for prayer in public setting cases. As a result,
Establishment clause jurisprudence has been described as
" 'chaotic,' 'doctrinal gridlock,' a 'legal quagmire,' contradictory
and unprincipled, 'ad hoc,' 'intuitive,' and a 'maze.' "91 Therefore,
it seems as if the best approach is to analyze the Santa Fe Indep.
Sch. Dist. decision in light of other cases involving prayer in
public settings.
In 1962, Engel v. Vitale92 represented the first application of
the Establishment Clause to a case involving prayer in a public
setting. In this case, the New York Board of Regents composed a
prayer that was recited at the start of each school day by the
88 See discussion supra Part I.A-B.
89 See supra note 67 (setting forth the original understanding of the Bill of
Rights as applied to the states, which was overturned by the incorporation
doctrine).
90 See Langendorfer, supra note 42, at 705 ("The Establishment Clause has
been greatly litigated, with more than seventy cases decided by the United States
Supreme Court since the 1940s, yet the Court has been unable to agree for any
amount of time on a standard method for determining if the Establishment Clause
has been violated."); Robert C. Stelle, Comment, Religious Freedom in the Twenty-
First Century: Life Without Lemon, 23 S. ILL. U. L.J. 657, 658 (1999) ("[Tlhe
Supreme Court has failed in recent years to clearly articulate just exactly what the
proper legal test is... to be applied to alleged violations of the Establishment
Clause.").
91 McCarthy, supra note 59, at 124.
92 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
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teacher and his or her class.93 The Supreme Court held that
such a practice violated the Establishment Clause9 4 even though
the prayer was "nondenominational" and "noncoercive."95 In
reaching this decision, the Court found that
[the] constitutional prohibition against laws respecting an
establishment of religion must at least mean that in this
country it is no part of the business of government to compose
official prayers for any group of the American people to recite
as a part of a religious program carried on by government. 96
Disregarding the states' right to govern church-state
relations that was provided by the Framers, the Court, to
support its holding, recited irrelevant history regarding the
colonists' plight to free themselves from the religious constraints
imposed by the Church of England. 97
One year later, the Supreme Court decided School District of
Abington Township v. Schempp.98  This case involved the
consolidation of two suits.99 In the first suit, a Pennsylvania
statute mandated that a minimum of ten verses from the Bible
were to be read to students at the beginning of each school day
followed by a recitation of the Lord's Prayer.100 The other suit,
taking place in Baltimore, Maryland, similarly involved reading
a chapter of the Bible to the students. 1 1 To resolve this matter,
the Court created a test that asks what is the purpose and the
93 See id. at 422.
9 See id. at 424 ("[T]he State of New York has adopted a practice wholly
inconsistent with the Establishment Clause.").
95 See id. at 430 ("The Establishment Clause... does not depend upon any
showing of direct governmental compulsion and is violated by the enactment of laws
which establish an official religion whether those laws operate directly to coerce
nonobserving individuals or not."). The Court would renege on this view thirty years
later in Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
96 Engel, 370 U.S. at 425. The Court later went on to note that "one of the
greatest dangers to the freedom of the individual to worship in his own way lay in
the Government's placing its official stamp of approval upon one particular kind of
prayer or one particular form of religious services." Id. at 429.
97 See id. at 425-28 (discussing the practices utilized by the Church of
England). The Church of England established "governmental composed prayers for
religious services" that set out in detail the acceptable content and form of prayers
and religious ceremonies. Id. In addition, the Church allowed powerful groups to
lobby for amendments to the Book of Common Prayers. See id.
98 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
99 See id. at 205.
10N See id. at 206-07. This practice allowed a student to be excused upon
providing a written note from his or her parents or guardians. See id. at 205.
101 See id. at 211-12.
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primary effect of the enactment?10 2 In this case, it found that the
practices at issue violated this two-prong analysis. 1°3 The Court,
however, indicated that it might have decided differently in the
Baltimore suit if there were "factors" tending to show that "the
Bible [was] used either as an instrument for nonreligious moral
inspiration or as a reference for the teaching of secular
subjects.'U0 4
Beginning in 1981, the Supreme Court reviewed a trilogy of
cases involving student-prayer groups. 05 In the first case, the
Supreme Court applied the Lemon test,106 and found a state
university's refusal to allow a student-religious group to use its
facilities in order to adhere to the tenets of the Establishment
Clause unwarranted. 10 7 Nine years later, a plurality found that
the Equal Access Act, which granted a right to student high
school groups to meet at public schools during non-instructional
time in a limited public forum setting, did not violate the
Establishment Clause. 08 The last of these cases held that the
funding of a student religious group's activities by a state
university would not violate the Establishment Clause because
102 Id. at 222. "[Tlhere must be a secular legislative purpose and a primary
effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion." Id. As in Engel, the Court again
stated that a violation of the Establishment Clause does not require coercion. See id.
at 223. Eight years later, this two prong test would be incorporated into the mode of
analysis created by Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
103 See School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 223-24
(1963).
104 Id. at 224 ("[Tihe State's recognition of the pervading religious character of
the ceremony is evident from the rule's specific permission of the alternative use of
the Catholic Douay version as well as the recent amendment permitting
nonattendance at the exercises.").
105 See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819
(1995); Bd. of Educ. of the Westside Cmty. Sch. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990);
Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
106 See infra notes 136-38 and accompanying text (providing an explanation of
the Lemon test).
107 See Widmar, 454 U.S. at 271-75 (finding that religion would not be
advanced by the "incidental benefits" received by the religious group).
108 See Mergens, 496 U.S. at 253 ("[We hold that the Equal Access Act does not
on its face contravene the Establishment Clause."). Using the Lemon test, the
plurality found that the Act had a secular purpose of promoting speech. See id. at
248-49. It also found the Act did not advance religion, because "secondary school
students are mature enough and are likely to understand that a school does not
endorse or support student speech that it merely permits on a nondiscriminatory
basis." Id. at 250. Furthermore, mere custodial oversight did not create excessive
entanglement. See id. at 252-53.
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in Widmar v. Vincent'09 and Board of Education of the Westside
Community Schools v. Mergens,11 the universities spent money
to provide those groups with a meeting place."' Although the
facts in this line of cases are not completely analogous to those
involving prayer in a public setting, these cases are important in
addressing the problem of excessive entanglement." 2
In Marsh v. Chambers,113 decided in 1983, the Supreme
Court encountered prayer in a different public setting, the
Nebraska legislature. 114 In this case, a Nebraska taxpayer
challenged, as an Establishment Clause violation, the
legislature's practice of opening each session with a prayer
delivered by a chaplain." 5 The Supreme Court held that this
practice did not violate the Clause because "[tihe opening of
sessions of legislative and other deliberative public bodies with
prayer is deeply embedded in the history and tradition of this
country."116 Upon this statement, the following query must be
raised: What is the difference between the tradition of prayer in
governmental bodies and the tradition of letting the states
govern their own church-state relationships? Moreover, it must
be noted that the chaplain in this case, a Presbyterian, delivered
the invocation for sixteen years. 117 Furthermore, the majority
distinguished this situation from the school prayer cases in that
the claimant, being an adult, was not likely to succumb to
religious indoctrination or pressure from his peers.118
109 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
110 496 U.S. 226 (1990).
M See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 843
(1995) ("The government usually acts by spending money. Even the provision of a
meeting room, as in Mergens and Widmar, involved governmental expenditure, if
only in the form of electricity and heating or cooling costs.").
112 See infra notes 166-69 and accompanying text.
113 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
114 See id. at 784.
115 See id. at 784-86. The Executive Board of the Legislative Council chose the
chaplain, and the chaplain was compensated with public funds. See id. at 784-85.
116 Id. at 786. The Court then supported its holding with an examination of the
tradition associated with prayer in governmental bodies. See id. at 786-90.
117 See id. at 793. The Court downplayed this fact by noting that "the evidence
indicates that [the chaplain] was reappointed because his performance and personal
qualities were acceptable to the body appointing him." Id. It also stated that there
were guest chaplains during the chaplain's absences. See id.
118 See id. at 792. In relation to the Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. decision, the
statement made here broaches the question: Is a high school student mature enough
to be considered "an adult... not readily susceptible to 'religious indoctrination,'...
or peer pressure?" Id. A plurality in Board of Education of Westside Community
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Two years later, in Wallace v. Jaffree,"9 the Court
considered an Establishment Clause challenge to an Alabama
statute allowing for a moment of silent prayer before the
beginning of the school day's first class.120 After reviewing the
legislative history behind the statute, the Court found that the
statute violated the Establishment Clause. 121 More specifically,
the Court utilized the Lemon test to find that the statute failed
the first prong of the test requiring a secular purpose. 122
In 1992, the Supreme Court decided the case of Lee v.
Weisman.123 In Lee, a middle school principal invited a rabbi to
deliver an invocation at the school's commencement exercises. 124
At the ceremony, the rabbi delivered a non-denominational
prayer that made several references to God.125  Instead of
applying the Lemon test, the Court applied a coercion analysis 126
and held that the practice violated the Establishment Clause. 127
More specifically, it found that the state officials had a great deal
of control over the invocation and benediction. 128 Additionally,
Schools v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990), answered this question in the affirmative
when it stated, "We think that secondary school students are mature enough and
are likely to understand that a school does not endorse or support student speech
that it merely permits on a nondiscriminatory basis." Id. at 250 (emphasis added).
119 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
120 See id. at 41-42. The statute at issue provided that "the teacher... may
announce that a period of silence not to exceed one minute in duration shall be
observed for meditation or voluntary prayer, and during any such period no other
activities shall be engaged in." Id. at 40 n.2.
121 See id. at 56-60 (examining statements made by a senator and the governor
of Alabama).
122 See id. at 60 ('The legislature enacted [the statute] for the sole purpose of
expressing the State's endorsement of prayer activities for one minute at the
beginning of each schoolday.").
123 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
124 See id. at 581. The rabbi was provided with a pamphlet setting forth
guidelines for the delivery of the prayer. These guidelines provided that the speaker
should deliver a nonsectarian prayer. See id.
125 See id. at 581-82 (providing in full the invocation and benediction delivered
at the graduation ceremony by Rabbi Gutterman).
126 See id. at 587 ("ITihe Constitution guarantees that government may not
coerce anyone to support or participate in religion or its exercise, or otherwise act in
a way which 'establishes a [state] religion or religious faith, or tends to do so.' ")
(citations omitted). But see supra notes 95, 102 and accompanying text (commenting
on earlier precedent that declared coercion irrelevant in an Establishment Clause
analysis).
127 See Lee, 505 U.S. at 598. ("[Ihe conformity required of the student in this
case was too high an exaction to withstand the test of the Establishment Clause.").
128 See id. at 586-90 (emphasizing that school supervision and peer pressure
required objecting students to participate in the exercise).
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although attendance was not obligatory, it was still coercive
since the experience of graduating high school is a significant
occasion in one's life.129 Furthermore, the majority believed that
this case was not akin to the Marsh situation, in which prayer
was permitted to open a legislative session,130 because "[t]he
atmosphere at the opening of a session of a state legislature
where adults are free to enter and leave with little comment...
cannot compare with the constraining potential of the one school
event most important for the student to attend."' 31 With this
decision, the Court seemed to indicate that the Lemon test was
no longer useful in these types of analyses, especially since all of
the opinions ignored the test. 32 This "trend," however, was
short-lived with the Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. decision.
B. An Analysis of Santa Fe Independent School District in
Light of Public Setting Prayer Precedent
As explained above,133 the Court in Santa Fe Indep. Sch.
Dist. employed a multifaceted attack to reach its decision.134 To
invalidate the policy on its face, however, the Court resorted to
the Lemon test.135 An evaluation of the Court's invalidation will
ensue in light of the public setting prayer precedent outlined
above. As will be shown, this policy was prematurely struck
down and not given the opportunity to operate constitutionally
or unconstitutionally. Within that analysis, it will be contended
that the application of the coercion and endorsement tests
should not have been reached since no speech was ever delivered
under the School District's new October policy.
129 See id. at 595 ("A school rule which excuses attendance is beside the point.").
130 See supra notes 111-15 and accompanying text.
131 Lee, 505 U.S. at 597.
132 See supra note 126 (setting forth the majority's coercion approach); Lee, 505
U.S. at 599-609 (Blackmun, J., concurring) ("Government may neither promote nor
affiliate itself with any religious doctrine or organization, nor may it obtrude itself
in the internal affairs of any religious institution."); id. at 609-631 (Souter, J.,
concurring) (arguing that the coercion test alone is not enough for this type of
situation); id. at 631-646 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("'[Tihe meaning of the Clause is to
be determined with reference to historical practices and understandings.' ")
(citations omitted).
133 See supra notes 32-55 and accompanying text.
134 See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 301-14 (2000) (utilizing
the coercion test set forth in Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992)); id. at 307-09
(applying the endorsement test); id. at 314-17 (applying the Lemon test).
135 See id. at 314 (setting forth the three factors articulated in Lemon v.
Kurtzman) (citations omitted)).
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C. The Lemon that Will Not Rot
In Lemon v. Kurtzman,136 the Supreme Court held that
Pennsylvania and Rhode Island statutes providing particular
types of state aid to parochial schools were invalid under the
Establishment Clause.137 This holding, however, was merely a
footnote to the three part test that was articulated by the Court:
"First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose;
second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither
advances nor inhibits religion... ; finally, the statute must not
foster 'an excessive government entanglement with religion .' "138
This test has endured a rocky history, but has been
reinvigorated with the Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. decision.
Up until the Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. decision, it seemed
as if the Court no longer held the Lemon test in high esteem.
Recently, the Court has employed the Lemon test sparingly.139
Most significantly, this test was not applied in the latest of the
public setting prayer cases. 140 Similarly, it was also not resorted
to when the Court decided the constitutionality of prayer in the
legislature. 141 Analogously, the mere existence of other tests
lends support to the Court's dissatisfaction. 142
136 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
137 See id. at 625.
138 Id. at 612-13 (citations omitted).
139 See Stelle, supra note 90, at 658 ("Between 1971, the year the court decided
Lemon, and 1992, the Court used this test in thirty of thirty-one cases in which the
Establishment Clause was invoked. Since then, however, this test has effectively
been abandoned with no clear replacement announced.").
140 See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 587 (1992) (applying the coercion test).
The coercion test is the principle emanating from the Constitution that "government
may not coerce anyone to support or participate in religion or its exercise. . . ." Id
The Court stated that a religious exercise at a school graduation ceremony created
"subtle coercive pressures," leaving the student no alternative to the appearance of
participation in the exercise. Id. at 585, 593-94.
141 See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 786 (1983) (considering the history
behind prayers in the legislature).
142 See, e.g., Lee, 505 U.S. at 587 (applying the coercion test); see also County of
Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 592-94 (1989) (applying the endorsement test).
The Court noted the need to closely watch whether a governmental practice has the
purpose or effect of "endorsing" religion. Id. at 592. It then went on to elaborate the
term "endorsement" to cover situations where the government favors, prefers, or
promotes religion, religious beliefs or religious theory. Id at 593-94 (noting that the
government may not take a position on religious beliefs nor make adherence to a
particular religious belief relevant to a person's standing in the political
community); see also Brian J. Serr, A Not-So-Neutral "Neutrality". An Essay on the
State of the Religion Clauses on the Brink of the Third Millennium, 51 BAYLOR L.
REv. 319, 332-35 (1999) (summarizing the various Establishment Clause tests).
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Furthermore, a substantial amount of dissents have
expressed dismay towards this mode of analysis. 143 Likewise,
commentators have questioned the test's viability.144 In light of
these considerations, it is astonishing that the Court applied the
Lemon analysis in this context. Nonetheless, the results of this
application must be examined.
D. The School District's October Policy Was Not Facially
Invalid
The first prong of the Lemon test requires that the School
District's policy operate under a "secular legislative purpose.' 45
Looking back to the Enge146 and Schempp147 decisions, those
policies clearly operated with religious purposes. In Schempp,
however, the Court indicated that "factors" tending to show that
"the Bible [was] used... as an instrument for nonreligious
moral inspiration" might have led it to uphold the public school's
reading of the bible to its students. 148 In Santa Fe Indep. Sch.
Dist., there was a question as to whether the policy was
implemented for "nonreligious moral inspiration." The School
District inserted into its policy a statement that the purpose of
the pre-game ceremony was "to solemnize the event, to promote
good sportsmanship and student safety, and to establish the
appropriate environment for competition." 49 Thus, it appears as
these words connote a sense of "nonreligious moral inspiration."
143 See, e.g., Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 318-20 (2000)
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (describing Lemon's "checkered career in the decisional
law of this Court"); Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687,
751-52 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The problem with (and the allure of) Lemon
has not been that it is 'rigid,' but rather that in many applications it has been
utterly meaningless, validating whatever result the Court would desire."); Wallace
v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 112 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (describing the test as
a "constitutional theory [that] has no basis in the history of the amendment it seeks
to interpret, is difficult to apply and yields unprincipled results .... ").
144 E.g., Christian W. Johnston, Agostini v. Felton: Redefining the
Establishment of Religion through a Modification of the Lemon Test, 26 PEPP. L.
REV. 407, 430 (1999) ("Lemon is still good law, although it may not be the best
law."); Stelle, supra note 90, at 658 (expressing concern about the test's "disuse").
145 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971).
146 See supra notes 92-97 and accompanying text (explaining the Engel
decision).
147 See supra notes 98-104 and accompanying text (summarizing the Schempp
decision).
148 Sch. Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 224 (1963).
149 Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 298 n.6 (2000).
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Upon examining the policy's purposes, the majority in Santa
Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. declared that the policy's words were not
neutral due to the extent of the school's involvement in the policy
and the use of words like "invocation."150 This policy, however,
was not as sectarian as the statutes in Engel and Schempp,
which specified the actual prayers and readings to be
delivered. 151  Instead, the School District's policy merely
provided that the message, which could have been either
religious or nonreligious, was to be chosen by the elected
student.152 Unlike Engel and Schempp, the School District
played no role in composing an official prayer.153
Moreover, the policy was certainly more content neutral
than the statute that was upheld in Marsh, which allowed for
prayer in the legislature. 54 In fact, the policy was very similar
to the Marsh statute since the student body, like the legislature,
was to decide upon the speaker. Additionally, both the policy
statement and statute implicitly adhered to the historical
principles that permitted states to govern church-state
relationships within their borders.
In Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., the Court implored that the
context surrounding the creation of the policy statement must be
considered in determining the policy's purpose.155  Upon
examining the context, the Court found that the "policy was
implemented with the purpose of endorsing school prayer."156
This context did reveal that the policy was originally geared
toward delivery of prayer. 157  The School District officials,
however, did not act blatantly like the governor and senator in
the Wallace decision by explicitly declaring that the policy was
for purposes of religion. 158 Furthermore, as the dissent noted,
the context of the Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. policy should be
150 See id. at 314-15.
151 See supra notes 92-104.
152 See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 530 U.S. at 298 n.6.
153 Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 425 (1962).
154 See supra notes 111-16 and accompanying text.
155 Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 530 U.S. at 317.
156 Id. at 315.
157 See supra notes 13-26 and accompanying text (providing a summary the
policy's creation).
158 See Wallace v. Jaifree, 472 U.S. 38, 56-59 (1985) (noting the remarks of the
Senator and Governor and the fact that the Alabama "did not present evidence of
any secular purpose"); see also supra notes 117-20 and accompanying text
(explaining the Wallace decision).
[Vol.75:137
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE CHAOS
disregarded since it was conceivable that "the school district was
acting diligently to come within the governing constitutional
law.' 59
The second prong of the Lemon test provides that the
policy's "principal or primary effect must be one that neither
advances nor inhibits religion."160 This prong, however, can not
even be addressed since no speech was ever delivered under the
new October policy.161 With its decision, the Court "venture[d]
into the realm of prophesy."162 It appears as if the majority was
merely speculating when it determined that there would be an
unconstitutional religious message under the new policy.
Although such a message was delivered under previous
policies, 163 those policies allowed for religious messages. It
would not be proper, however, to claim that the same type of
message would be delivered under the new policy. Most
significantly, unlike the public setting prayer precedent
presented above, the Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. court did not
provide the district with the opportunity to operate
constitutionally or unconstitutionally.
Likewise, since a religious speech never occurred, the Court
could not have known if the government "coerce[d] anyone to
support or participate in religion or its exercise" under a coercion
analysis. 64 Analogously, an endorsement test could not be
administered here since the court could not have fathomed
whether "the members of the listening audience [could] perceive
the pregame message as a public expression of the views of the
majority of the student body delivered with the approval of the
school administration."165  Furthermore, in its speculative
analysis, the Court turned a blind eye to a past statement in
which it declared that "secondary school students are mature
enough and are likely to understand that a school does not
endorse or support student speech that it merely permits on a
nondiscriminatory basis."166
159 Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 530 U.S. at 323 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
160 Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612.
161 See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 530 U.S. at 298 n.5.
162 Id. at 319 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
163 See supra notes 14-22 and accompanying text.
16 Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 587 (1992).
165 Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 530 U.S. at 308.
166 Bd. of Educ. of the Westside Cmty. Sch. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 250 (1990)
(emphasis added).
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The third prong of the Lemon test stipulates that "the
statute must not foster 'an excessive government entanglement
with religion.'"167 To address this consideration, the student
prayer group cases can provide some insight.168 Like those cases,
the School District in Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. merely enacted
a policy that created the potential for religious student speech on
public school grounds. Additionally, both the student speaker in
Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. and the student-prayer groups in
those cases would be merely supplied with "incidental
benefits."169 While the student prayer groups would be provided
with a place to meet, the student speaker in Santa Fe Indep.
Sch. Dist. would be provided with access to the football field's
public address system.
CONCLUSION
In a past case, the Supreme Court declared that "[w]e are a
religious people ... ."17o With its holding in Santa Fe Indep. Sch.
Dist., however, the Court may have totally eliminated any
opportunity for states to experiment with speech policies that
would allow for constitutionally valid prayer in a public setting.
In consequence, time-honored traditions like pre-football game
prayer will probably have to yield to the Court's confused
Establishment Clause jurisprudence. As illustrated by the Santa
Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. decision, clarification is needed to bring
order to this important area of constitutional law.
167 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 613 (citations omitted).
168 See supra notes 105-09 and accompanying text (synthesizing Supreme
Court cases involving student prayer groups on public school grounds).
169 Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 273 (1981).
170 Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952).
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